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Abstract 
Since the 1950s, federal transfers have been moulded and remoulded under practically every 
Prime Minister. The current iteration of transfers, specifically the 2014 implementation of equal-
per-capita funding through the Canada Health Transfer, poses major problems to regional 
disparities, and arguably favours provinces that have high growth; this leaves poorer provinces, 
like the Maritimes, to make major cuts to provincial budgets in order to maintain the standards 
set out in the Canada Health Act. This paper explores the history of transfers, why transfers are 
necessary for Canadians, as well as the criticisms of the current system. Following this, it is 
recommended that a needs-based model for determining health transfers be adopted; specifically, 
the model developed by Marchildon and Mou that accounts for an aging population as well as 
one that is geographically dispersed. This paper provides a more contemporary analysis on 
federal transfers as they relate to the health care system. Additionally, it focuses somewhat on 
the issues New Brunswick is facing currently as, among other things, a result of inadequate 
funding from the federal government. 
Keywords: health policy, public policy, federal transfers, Canada Health Transfer, provincial 
politics, Canadian politics  
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Introduction 
In the world’s second largest country in terms of total area, divided into ten provinces and 
three territories, how is it possible to maintain a sense of unity or cohesion in Canada from coast 
to coast? This is where the foundation of federalism lies: provinces are under the umbrella of the 
federal government, where social and fiscal policies are put in place to ensure equal status and 
opportunity for citizens while still allowing for provincial governments to decide on the specifics 
of fiscal and social programs. The relationship between the federal and provincial/territorial 
levels, and to a certain extent the provincial and municipal levels, has been debated and 
undergone changes since confederation. Stemming from federal-provincial relations is the 
existence of federal transfers, where the province receives payment from the federal government 
in order to equalize provincial revenues, or, now, to aid in public service delivery such as 
healthcare or post-secondary education. There are two types of transfers that can be discussed: 
equalization as a “horizontal fiscal redistribution” program (Lecours 569), or transfer programs 
given to all provinces for the purpose of aiding in public service delivery. This paper is more 
heavily focused on the latter: transfer programs given to provinces for the purpose of public 
service delivery, specifically health care spending, the Canada Health Act (CHA) and the 
Canada Health Transfer (CHT). 
Over the past fifty years the nature of federal transfers has undergone numerous changes, 
with the most recent changes having potentially damaging effects on some provincial budgets. It 
is important to examine the history of federal transfers since the 1950s and understand where 
problems have, arguably, always existed in the system. This paper argues in favour of a needs-
based solution to federal health transfer spending. In the 2014-2015 fiscal year, alone, $32.1 
billion was spent through the CHT, compared to $12.6 billion for the Canada Social Transfer 
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(CST) (Gauthier, 2012). This number has been steadily rising for the past ten years, and is 
expected to rise further due to the aging population along with more demands on the healthcare 
budget of provinces. Furthermore, relatively new changes to the CHT effectively disenfranchise 
provinces that do not have sufficient population growth; the federal government, for the past 
decade, has been accused of deliberately perpetuating inequalities between provinces.  
Constitutional Obligations for Equalization 
Maintaining effective federal transfers is crucial to ensuring Canada adheres to its Charter 
obligations on equalization. The foundation for equalization in Canada is outlined in s. 36 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that  
36. (1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial 
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative 
authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and 
the provincial governments, are committed to 
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; 
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and 
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. 
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making 
equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to 
provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels 
of taxation (CA1982). 
The federal government, according to the Charter, is obligated to ensure that reasonably 
comparable public services are available in all provinces and this obligation is carried out 
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through equalization as well as, now, with health and social transfers. As is the issue with the 
Charter and similar legislation, words such as comparably and reasonable are vague enough for 
the interpretation of section 36 to change, according to the political will and government of the 
day. Senator Noel Kinsella once called for Canada to create a charter of social and economic 
rights; in most respects, this charter would build on section 36 of the Charter and give it some 
"teeth" (Kinsella, 2007). In an era where the federal government is slowly putting more 
responsibility on the provinces to cover the spending for social programs, it seems unlikely that a 
charter of social and economic rights is in the near future. 
In his essay that compares and contrasts equalization in principle and practice, Douglas 
H. Clark states that the principles for equalization consist of “clear purpose, effectiveness, 
equity, efficiency, nation building, accountability, visibility and transparency, sustainability and 
stability,” (Clark, 1969). While the purpose of equalization, a tax revenue redistribution program, 
is to level the playing field of provincial revenues, the concept has been under scrutiny by 
political scientists and economists largely from provinces that do not receive equalization 
payments such as Alberta, British Columbia, and, until recently (2009), Ontario.  Furthermore, it 
has been accused of creating dependency and stagnating provincial economic growth in ‘have-
not’ provinces (Dickson, 1989; McMillan, 2012). Richard Starr argues that, fundamentally, the 
debate over federal transfers is an ideological issue stemming from a Fraser Institute 1978 
collection of essays which has since gained traction (Starr, 2014). Whether the debate has been 
fuelled by ideology or not, Canada’s federal transfer programs have been moulded and 
remoulded for the past half-century into current programs that are unsustainable, arguably do not 
fulfill the federal government’s constitutional obligations, and force historically ‘have-not’ 
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provinces into inescapable levels of debt while also forcing historically wealthy provinces into 
being labelled ‘have-not’.  
 
Background: Fifty Years of Transfers 
Before thoroughly examining the current situation in fiscal federalism as well as potential 
solutions, it is important to overview the history of transfer payments and how the relationship 
between the federal and provincial government has changed dramatically since the 1950s. This 
will give the needed context to best understand the current situation, where transfer payments 
other than equalization are largely based on demographics and population growth, and thus put 
more responsibilities on provinces that struggle with population growth. As one can guess, much 
of the discourse surrounding equalization and transfer payments has to do with the impact on 
Atlantic Canada; historically, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and, to a 
lesser extent, Newfoundland and Labrador, have the reputation for being relatively poor 
provinces. More recently, much of the discussion has surrounded Ontario; first with the 
controversial Mowat Center reports on equalization and then Ontario Premier Wynne’s “Fairness 
for Ontarians” slogan to raise awareness that the province was being short-changed by the 
federal government (Starr, 2014).  
Equalization 
Canada’s first iteration of federal transfers began in 1957 with equalization payments by 
the St-Laurent government. Equalization was, and still is, based on a formula to determine which 
provinces are in need of assistance in order to bring them up to a benchmark. Originally, this 
formula was based on determining the per capita tax yield of all provinces – the highest two in 
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1957 being Ontario and British Columbia, averaging them, then aiming to bring all other 
provinces up to that average through redistributing the taxed revenues collected by the federal 
government (Starr, 2014). When this program originally began, the taxes used to determine a 
province’s yield were personal income tax, corporate income tax, and inheritance tax; since then, 
taxes such as natural resource tax are also considered (Starr, 2014). The government might 
collect a little more in order to distribute wealth more equally throughout the country, but for the 
most part the redistribution has been from already taxed revenues from the provinces.  
Cost-Sharing Arrangements 
Later in the 1960s, cost-sharing arrangements were put in place, such as Medicare (1966), 
Hospital Insurance, the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act 1967 for post-secondary 
education, and the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), which was a “50/50 cost-sharing program 
covering eligible expenditures that provincial, territorial and municipal governments incurred in 
providing social assistance and welfare services,” (Gauthier, 2012). The term cost-sharing is 
associated with this period in federalism because the costs for these programs were shared by the 
provincial and federal governments; in exchange for funding, there would generally be 
guidelines for provinces to follow if they were to receive the full funding available to them. 
While the healthcare sector and other social services are primarily under jurisdiction of the 
provinces, and have been since confederation through the Constitution of 1867, the federal 
government helps fund many of these programs to ensure all Canadians have access to them. 
What should be noted is that these cost-sharing programs are not based on an equal-per-capita 
basis, meaning “the level of federal support reflected both provincial and territorial spending 
decisions and the specific labour market circumstances of each province and territory,” 
(Gauthier, 2012).  
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Established Programs Financing and an end to Cost-Sharing 
During the Pierre Trudeau era, in 1977, the Established Programs Financing (EPF) was 
created and combined all federal transfers other than equalization and CAP (Dept. Finance, 
2014). Rather than being a cost-sharing program, the EPF was made up of two sources of 
funding: tax transfer and cash transfer. “The value of the tax points grew in line with the 
economy. The growth rate of the cash transfer was modified several times as the program 
underwent changes throughout the years,” (Dept. Finance, 2014). When the CHA was created 
under Trudeau’s second run as Prime Minister in 1984, the EPF was used as a bargaining tool for 
provinces to follow the guidelines set out in the CHA: “EPF funding was made conditional on 
respect for the five criteria of the Canada Health Act (universality, accessibility, portability, 
comprehensiveness, and public administration) and provisions for withholding funding were 
introduced,” (Dept. Finance, 2014). While guidelines are necessary for funding, the government 
ran into issues with penalties for failure to comply with the CHA, especially considering a 
number of growth limitations placed on EPF funding. In a review of the Canada Health and 
Social Transfer for the federal government, Odette Madore writes that: 
Until 1991-1992, penalties for failure to comply with the CHA were applied only against 
cash transfer for EPF-Health; however, they were later also applied against other 
provincial entitlements. This extension of financial penalties to cash transfers under other 
federal programs was made necessary by the continual limitations placed on the growth 
rate of EPF transfers [by the federal government] and the particular effects of such 
restrictions on the cash transfers; it was estimated that EPF-Health cash transfers to some 
provinces would have reached zero by the end of the century. Without the cash transfer, 
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the federal government would no longer have had the power to enforce the CHA’s 
requirements. (Madore, 2003). 
Funding could also be withheld if provinces did not adhere to certain standards for other 
programs. One example concerning the CAP occurred in 1995, when the Government of British 
Columbia “decided to impose, starting on 1 December 1995, a three month residency 
requirement before individuals could receive social assistance. That same month, the Honourable 
Lloyd Axworthy, then federal Minister then responsible for CAP, announced that CAP transfer 
payments to British Columbia would be reduced by $47.1 million,” (Madore, 2003). In some 
regards, while potentially restrictive, this incentivized the provinces to maintain certain standards 
for accessing public services.  
Creating one Fund for Transfers: the CHST, and “Equal per Capita”  
The 1995-1996 federal budget completely changed the landscape of Canada’s federal 
transfer system. Where there had previously been some form of conditional granting, or cost-
sharing arrangement, the Chretien government combined the CAP and EPF into one fund, the 
Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) (Dept. Finance, 2014). This essentially combined 
funding for health care, post-secondary education, social assistance, and social services into one 
giant block fund. Its funding model took after the original 1977 EPF formula, which included tax 
transfer and cash transfer portions; however, the total amount of funding to a province was 
allocated on an “equal per capita basis” (Dept. Finance, 2014). Madore writes that “it was felt 
that the CHST would give the provinces more discretion over how funds were to be divided 
among health care and other social programs. More provincial flexibility, however… led to 
reduced federal visibility and transparency in these fields and diminished provincial 
accountability for how federal transfers are spent,” (Madore, 2003).  
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During the 1990’s spending cuts were occurring throughout the country:  
 Frank McKenna, premier of New Brunswick, made cuts to public services like 
school boards, hospital boards, public sector wages and jobs;  
 PEI’s Catherine Callbeck also cut civil service jobs and wages;  
 John Savage of Nova Scotia followed New Brunswick and PEI, but also raised 
taxes; 
 Saskatchewan’s Roy Romanow implemented program cuts and tax increases; 
 Ralph Klein, Alberta’s Premier at the time, “eliminated [Alberta’s] deficit entirely 
through spending cuts totalling 20 per cent between 1993 and 1996;” 
 Ontario’s Premier Mike Harris looked to the US for more economic growth 
through trade as well as cutting spending and raising taxes (Starr, 2014). 
The whole country was truly in economic turmoil; the federal government, too, ended up cutting 
program spending mostly in the form of cutting federal transfers to the provinces. Whereas 
Mulroney had already “reduced federal spending from 20 to 17 per cent GDP,” Richard Starr 
accused the Chretien government of destroying Canada’s welfare state; he wrote that “the 
already tattered welfare state was ripped pretty much to shreds,” (Starr, 2014). These spending 
cuts really surfaced in the newly formed CHST in 1996. In 1995 combined EPF and CAP 
spending was $16.25 billion for the provinces; this number dropped to $12.45 billion with the 
singular CHST in 1996, then again down to just $9.85 billion in 1997 (Starr, 2014). While the 
government of the day claimed that spending was being cut proportionally across the board, this 
was simply not the case. In 1996 CHST spending was cut by 18.9%, whereas all other federal 
program spending was only cut 1.4%; in 1997 CHST spending was cut another 16.7% whereas 
all other program spending was only cut by 0.5% (1995 Federal Budget).  
A Change in how Funds are Transferred 
Aside from spending cuts, the move from EPF/CAP to CHST is also important due to the 
new way the funds are transferred. Before, there were cost-sharing arrangements to ensure that 
provinces were maintaining some level of comparable public services; as explained earlier, if 
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provinces did not uphold these obligations, their funding was on the line. In general, the cost of 
programs was shared equally by the federal government and provinces. However, the CHST was 
created as a block transfer. With one fund being given in one block, the federal government had 
no way to determine what was being spent on health or what was being spent on post-secondary 
education or welfare/social programs. While provinces were still on the hook for adhering to the 
CHA due to its implementation, block funding made it so that the federal government had no 
clear way of knowing how much of the funding was going to healthcare and how much was 
going to other areas like post-secondary education or social programs. Noticing this emerging 
issue, the federal government separated the CHST in 2003 into two funds: the Canada Health 
Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). Rather than cost-sharing arrangements 
where the federal government covered a certain percentage of the costs associated with programs 
covered under the fund, the CHT and CST were still block funds. Roughly “62% of the 
[previous] CHST tax transfer [was] allocated to the CHT, while the remaining 38% [was] 
devoted to the CST… the total entitlement of the two transfers [were projected to] grow in line 
with the [previous] cash and tax transfers. Total entitlements [were then to be] allocated among 
the provinces on an equal per capita basis” (Madore, 2003).  
The Current Situation: 2014-2015 Changes to Transfers 
Equal per capita transfers are not a new concept; certain portions of transfers had been 
equal per capita based since the EPF, however, the issue that has surfaced most recently was the 
Harper government’s decision to remove the “equalizing component of the CHT by legislative 
that the cash transfer move to an equal-per-capita allocation in 2014-2015,” (Deraspe, 2011). 
One issue arising can be seen in New Brunswick. The province has a rapidly aging population 
and sees two of every five publicly spent dollars going to health care (Saillant, 2014). For New 
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Brunswick, the total costs needed to cover health care adequately for every citizen cannot be 
accounted for by a per capita calculation (Saillant, 2014). While a per capita calculation sees just 
a population, the real picture is that there are varying levels of needs within that population. This 
is true for all provinces. The issue that New Brunswick is facing, with other provinces following 
suit, is its rapidly aging population. In 2015, for the first time, the province recorded more deaths 
than births. To give an idea of the impact on an economy that a disproportionately high elderly 
population can have on an economy, consider the research conducted by the Canada Institute for 
Health Information; a 2011 report showed that, “although [the elderly] make up only 14% of the 
population [of Canada], in 2009-2010, 40% of acute hospital stays were for patients 64 and 
older” (CIHI 2011). 
The equalizing portion of the CHT was removed beginning in 2014-2015 because the 
federal government believed that “interprovincial equity [was] more appropriately addressed 
through the Equalization program,” (Deraspe, 2011). What this new formula fails to recognize is 
that “there is a difference between equity and equality and treating everyone exactly the same 
may not always be fair” (Di Matteo, n.d.). Equality connotes that everyone taking from the pot 
receives the same amount, regardless; they are receiving equal treatment. Equity, on the other 
hand, implies that, of those taking from the pot, the amount they are taking will bring everyone 
up to an equal benchmark in order to make up for advantages and disadvantages. In Canada, “the 
provinces are not equal in their rates of population growth, the rates at which their population is 
aging, the proportion of aboriginal or immigrant population, or the incidence of various diseases. 
As a result, their differences can and, many would argue should, be a factor in provincial 
variations in per capita health spending” (Di Matteo, n.d.). By relying solely on the Equalization 
program to account for interprovincial equity, the federal government overlooks the 
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disadvantages that some provinces face. An effective health care funding model would ensure 
that all Canadians had the appropriate means and tools needed to maintain good health.  
Table 1  
 
PROVINCIAL CHT CASH ENTITLEMENTS ($M) 
 2013-2014 2014-2015 % Change 
NL 489.7 489.7 0.00% 
PEI 128 131.2 2.50% 
NS 829.9 846.8 2.00% 
NB 666.6 682.4 2.40% 
QC 7183.8 7426.7 3.40% 
ON 11925.1 12334.9 3.40% 
MB 1114.4 1156.3 3.80% 
SK 976.6 1019.3 4.40% 
AL 2722.9 3750.9 37.80% 
BC 4154.4 4169.5 0.40% 
YT 31 33.4 7.70% 
NT 27 39.2 45.20% 
NU 33.7 33.7 0.00% 
 
Amount of Funding Provinces Receive 
 The striking advantages and disadvantages inherent in this funding strategy become 
apparent in Table 1 (next page). This shows the percent change in CHT entitlements before and 
after the equal per capita changes occurred for 2014-2015. For the years just before these 
changes were implemented, CHT total entitlements had been growing at 6 percent annually. 
While this shows escalating growth, when a breakdown of entitlements for each province is 
displayed one can see that the total entitlements do not paint a complete picture of distribution 
between the provinces. Notwithstanding the territories, Alberta now receives the most funding 
through CHT with a 37.8% increase for the first year under the new funding model.  
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Newfoundland did not change and British Columbia only increased by .4% (Nadeau, 
2014). The Maritimes all received between 2.0% and 2.5% increase, and all other provinces saw 
increases between 3.4% and 4.4% (Nadeau, 2014). While equal per capita health care funding 
may, in theory, aid provinces that have the largest populations and require massive health care 
spending, this model does not accurately represent all the other factors that play into how much 
spending is needed for provincial health care, regardless of upholding a reasonably comparable 
level of it to other provinces.  
Is Equal-per-Capita Right for Canada? 
Reaction to the move toward equal-per-capita funding for the CHT was, for the most part, 
swift and merciless. Michael McBane of The Hill Times argued that the government was going to 
make it “next to impossible for provinces to provide health care services on equal terms and 
conditions” (McBane, 2014). Shortly after the change was announced, Josh Wingrove for The 
Globe and Mail argued that the per-capita health transfer was a “windfall [for Alberta] that 
comes at the expense of every other province” (Wingrove, 2012). In 2015, the Canadian 
Federation of Nurses Unions released a report criticizing the changes and cuts to transfer 
spending. In their critique, they argued that there is the “lack of a relationship between funding 
and the costs of delivering health care” (Mackenzie 25, 2015). This is because the move toward 
equal-per-capita was announced without provincial consultation and without consideration for, 
specifically, the cost of an aging population. This report also speaks to the disconnect between 
the CHT and the equalization provisions in the constitution by noting that while “the Act would 
appear to require that equalization programs make some attempt to measure and assess levels of 
service, in practice what has been equalized is not service but revenue” Mackenzie 25, 2015).  
One of the reasons for switching to equal-per-capita for the CHT was that the government 
argued equalization should not occur in health transfers; that health transfers should solely be 
about supplementing the provinces in funding the provision of health care. What this severely 
neglects is that the provision of health care is, increasingly, the most expensive public service 
available to Canadians. If equalization is needed anywhere, it would be within the healthcare 
sector. Furthermore, to argue that equalization should only be accounted for by the Equalization 
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program also neglects the fact that the level of funding available through Equalization and the 
CHT are not even comparable. Even after cuts to the total amount of funding available, the CHT 
and CST combined represent almost $50 billion of transfer funds for all provinces in 2015-2016 
(Mowat Centre, 2014). Comparatively, for the same year the Equalization program totals $17.3 
billion (Mowat Centre, 2014). If the sole purpose of the Equalization program is to fulfill those 
constitutional obligations while receiving less than required health transfers, then provinces 
would be hard pressed to cover just the health care sector without receiving adequate assistance 
in another form.  
Solutions to the Problem: More Reliable Research Required 
When discussing the next steps in how to address the issue of health care funding to 
provinces, it is absolutely paramount that a pan-Canadian study be conducted to better 
understand how the provinces use the resources they have and are given; any research must 
include qualitative data in order to demonstrate where shortfalls may lie within each 
province – something that statistics may not be able to accurately describe. While it could 
be argued that this has been done, specifically in 2013 with the Fraser Institute’s Provincial 
Health Care Index, the Institute’s conclusions and cost-value based analysis appear rather 
dubious in an effort to criticize the overall universal healthcare system. Furthermore, the 
Institute’s cost-value approach does not fully address the issue; while New Brunswick might 
spend the least on healthcare per capita and Alberta might spend the most, factors such as 
the overall age or well-being of the population, or relatively easy access to physicians is not 
addressed (Barua, 2013). Furthermore, while Alberta may spend more on healthcare, which 
is not necessarily bad, provinces are allocated funding specifically for the purposes of health 
care through the Canada Health Transfer. Therefore, provinces that receive the most will 
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clearly spend the most. The main difference between these two provinces, and why the 
inequality is so apparent even though they may be treated equally, is that growth and 
population is far from being the only determining factor in how expensive the provision of 
health care within a province can be. Furthermore, the fiscal capacity of a province must be 
considered in order to compare accurately. 
Research Conducted to Date 
In the past 60 years of equalization and transfer programs, it could be argued that there has 
likely never been consensus among the provinces that any given model has fully addressed the 
needs of each province. Practically since confederation, the Maritimes and Quebec, in particular, 
have been seen as reaping the rewards of the West’s hard work. Since the CHT changes that took 
effect in 2014 were announced in 2007, lobby and research organizations have come forward 
with solutions to the issue of growing healthcare costs with ineffective funding from the federal 
government. Two suggestions have been to implement the following: 
 A series of reforms to the Canada Health Act (Clemens, 2012). 
 A needs-based or expenditure-based formula that accounts for a province’s needs and 
forecasted expenditures (Marchildon and Mou, 2013; Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007). 
 
Reforming the Canada Health Act 
In 2012, Jason Clemens and Nadeem Esmail of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute published a 
report on how the CHA obstructs reform and innovation, and constrains provinces with regards 
to how block funding is used. The CHA is based on five core areas that act as the foundation for 
Canada’s universal healthcare system:  
 Public Administration, 
 Comprehensiveness, 
 Universality, 
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 Portability, and 
 Accessibility (Madore, 2003).  
 
Section 18 of the CHA states, “in order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution… 
for a fiscal year, no payments may be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the 
health care insurance plan of the province in respect of insured health services that have been 
subject to extra-billing by medical practitioners or dentists,” (CHA s. 18). Section 19 expands the 
previous section to include restricting user fees with the exceptions of the accommodation and 
meal payments of chronic care/long-term residents of hospitals (CHA s.19). Keeping in mind the 
importance of the Act, Clemens and Esmail suggest a total of four reforms to the CHA that 
would give provinces more autonomy in moulding their healthcare systems to best fit each 
unique situation.  
 The first reform is to section 8, regarding public administration. This section “creates the 
single insurer structure of Medicare, making competition in universal insurance impossible,” 
(Clemens and Esmail, 2012). They argue that provinces should be allowed the freedom “to 
determine their own health care policies” with regards to insurance plans and how they are 
operated/regulated (Clemens and Esmail, 2012). The second suggested reform is under section 
10, universality; while they believe the foundational point of universality in healthcare should be 
maintained, they argue for an amendment to this section, which would allow for more open 
competition and personalization of universal insurance in each province (Clemens and Esmail, 
2012). Section 12 ties closely with s. 36 of the Charter, in that it introduced the “undefined 
concept of reasonable access,” (Clemens and Esmail, 2012). It details how healthcare policies 
are to be structured in such a way that they’re relatively parallel province-to-province. The 
recommended reform for this is to set baseline parallel policies for low-income citizens, but 
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allow provinces more interpretational freedom for the middle and high-income earners in each 
province (Clemens and Esmail, 2012). Finally, they suggest that all sections of the CHA 
pertaining to extra billing and user charges be repealed entirely; they argue that these sections 
“[restrict] any sharing of costs between private payers and the public system,” (Clemens and 
Esmail, 2012).  
 While amending the CHA to allow for more provincial autonomy in healthcare spending 
seems like a fine solution, there could be unforeseen consequences. One such consequence could 
be shrugging off s. 36 of the Charter, which talks about reasonably comparable services. In 
Clemens and Esmail’s analysis of the reforms, it seems as though giving the provinces this level 
of autonomy could easily undermine s. 36 by giving provinces too much freedom in reforming 
the individual healthcare systems within each province, especially considering the regional 
disparities and level of low-income earners in some provinces compared to others. Furthermore, 
reforming the CHA may not address the root of the issue, which is poor policy decisions 
regarding federal transfers.  
Adopting a Needs-Based Funding Model 
In an article on promoting a needs-based funding formula for the CHT as an alternative to 
the equal per capita method, Marchildon and Mou propose that a more comprehensive funding 
formula that would reflect Canada’s constitution equalization obligations better would be to 
adopt a needs-based, or expenditure-based, health transfer formula. Specifically, they argue that 
by accounting for the age of a population, as well as geographical distribution (level of isolated 
or rural population within a region), a fairer funding model could be implemented. They argue 
that the original purpose of the CHT was “oriented to the expenditure side: to get provincial 
governments to provide universal hospital and medical care coverage under a defined set of very 
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high-level national standards” (Marchildon and Mou, 2014). This, in the beginning, was 
significantly different from the Equalization program that supplemented the revenues of 
provinces with a lower than average revenue-generating capacity. However, they explain that 
somewhere around the time that the health transfer turned into a block fund in 1977, the lines 
between these two funding programs became blurred. When the Canadian government did away 
with the block fund method, the expenditure-based funding formula did not return. The basic 
principle of needs-based funding is that “the characteristics of a population should drive its 
relative need for health services” (Marchildon and Mou, 2014). Some provinces such as British 
Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, at the provincial level, have “adjusted their per capita 
allocation based on age, gender, and socio-economic status of the population,” from the Ministry 
of Health to the provinces Regional Health Authorities (Marchildon and Mou, 2014). As such, 
within Canada there have already been successes in adopting this funding mode.  
Age plays an important factor in healthcare spending in two ways: in a 2013 average, 
Medicare expenditures were highest for infants and those aged 55 and above, exponentially 
rising for age brackets higher than 55-59 (Marchildon and Mou, 2014). While age plays an 
important role in determining how expensive a province’s total healthcare system is, it is not the 
only factor. Marchildon and Mou argue that geographical distribution of population should also 
be considered in a needs-based formula: “more than half of the Canadian population resides in 
the highly urbanized provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and the 13 provinces and territories have 
quite different patterns of population dispersion within their boundaries” (Marchildon and Mou, 
2014). This can create rural-urban disparities due to poor access to healthcare infrastructure and 
professionals in more rural areas; this “is a contributing factor to the poorer health status of rural 
residents compared with their urban peers,” (Marchildon and Mou, 2014). Furthermore, a 
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chronically underfunded system can trigger compounding needs for healthcare. Without access 
to infrastructure and healthcare professionals, health issues can compound and result in higher 
costs if left untreated. Marchildon and Mou focus on these two needs factors because they are 
arguably completely out of the hands or control of the provinces, and, thus, the provinces should 
not be held accountable; they argue that having an only equal per capita block fund for CHT 
creates and exaggerates the already prominent disparities between provinces with older and more 
geographically dispersed populations.  
 If the model Marchildon and Mou propose were to be implemented, “Alberta [would 
have] the most to lose, while [Newfoundland and Labrador] would have the most to gain,” 
(Marchildon and Mou, 2014). A total of eight provinces would gain, under this model, and two 
provinces would lose as a result of the adjustments.  
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland 
[would] receive more CHT funds because they have older-than-average age profiles and 
higher-than-average geographical dispersion. Quebec and Prince Edward Island would 
receive a larger transfer because their relatively “old” age profiles outweigh the effect of 
lower-than-average geographical dispersion, while Manitoba would receive more funding 
because its relatively high geographical dispersion outweighs the effect of its relatively 
young population. Ontario would lose the most (C$370 million) because of its relatively 
young and highly urbanized population, followed by Alberta, which would lose C$312 
million, primarily because of its even younger age profile. (Marchildon and Mou, 2014).  
In order for a policy such as this to be implemented, it could be argued that a culture shift within 
Canada would need to take place. Provinces such as British Columbia and Saskatchewan, as 
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mentioned earlier, have already adopted similar models at the provincial level; those provinces in 
particular are known to be relatively progressive and, adopting such a model country-wide would 
likely require major negotiations between the federal and provincial governments. The first 
hurdle in adopting a needs-based health transfer model would be for the federal government to 
obtain the political will for change in this area, and realize that without accounting for a number 
of indicators, such as age or geography, citizens in one part of the country are absolutely not 
receiving reasonably comparable health services to other citizens in a more growth-driven area.  
International Success with Needs-Based Transfer Formulas 
 Internationally, there has been some success with needs-based transfer formulas, at all 
levels of development. From these examples, best practices can quickly be picked out and it 
becomes easier to draw connections to how Canada could adopt such a model. Similarly to 
Canada, Australia collects a large amount of public sector revenues from its sub-national levels 
in order to redistribute in such a way that, “if each [sub-national government] each made the 
same effort to raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of efficiency, 
each would have the capacity to provide services at the same standard,” (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
2007). Australia’s method of determining the needs of a sub-national government have existed 
since 1933 and are re-evaluated on a five year basis “employing a very comprehensive approach 
using 18 revenue and 41 expenditure categories,” (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007). Some of these 
determinants include proportionality of age groups, unemployment rate, and per capita demand 
for in-patient hospital services.  
 Germany’s constitution is similar to Canada’s in one way: it guarantees equal living 
conditions in all parts of the country. The wording, however, is slightly stronger than Canada’s 
equalization obligation of reasonably comparable public services. Nevertheless, Germany uses 
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expenditure/needs-based formula in order to determine funding to the sub-national levels. 
Germany actually has three equalizing transfer programs; the purpose of two of these is to bring 
the fiscal-capacity of financially weaker states to a certain benchmark of the national average, 
around 90% (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007). They also note that Germany has the “most 
equalizing system found in federal countries,” though it has received criticism for penalizing 
wealthier states and “encouraging fiscal irresponsibility” in poorer states – something with which 
Canada also has experience (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007).  
Conclusion 
 This paper has overviewed the history of federal transfers in Canada and how, for the 
most part, disparities have been manufactured and perpetuated by a flawed system that does not 
account for the individual needs of each province, specifically with regards to health care 
spending. Canada does not have one unifying health care system, it has thirteen; the government 
must recognize this as fact and allow, to a certain extent, provinces more autonomy over how 
health care is delivered. Furthermore, it is essential that the Government of Canada recognize 
that there are more determining factors to how expensive a province’s health care costs are than 
the growth of their population. Two major solutions have been put forth on how to deal with 
health transfers; the first being to reform the Canada Health Act and the second being to adopt a 
completely different funding model for the CHT. Reforming the Canada Health Act for the 
reasons discussed is, arguably, not in the best interests of all provinces, specifically because 
Medicare is one of the cornerstones of the Canadian identity and all citizens should have access 
to similar services no matter where they choose to reside in the country. The recent move to total 
equal-per-capita block funding for the CHT is only beneficial to one province (Alberta) and one 
territory (Northwest Territories); all other provinces lose out in this situation. Unless a needs-
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based model such as the one that Marchildon and Mou developed is implemented, provinces will 
be plunged further into debt partly due to increasing demands on the health care system, with a 
government that does not have the political will or capacity to mitigate it. There has been success 
with such a model, provincially, and internationally where other countries have adopted funding 
models that are based on expenditures and the needs of a jurisdiction.   
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